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Introduction 
Italy is very well known for its long tradition of international and internal migration
1 
and less well known for its experience with immigration. Foreign migrants started to 
choose Italy as a destination country at the end of the 1970s, when after the first oil 
shock the Northern European countries adopted restrictive immigration policies 
which made it more difficult for foreigners to enter their labour markets. The inflows 
to Italy, and in general to the Southern European countries, thereafter became 
increasingly important, in 2007 reaching 6% of the population in Italy and Greece, 
4% in Portugal and 12% in Spain (OECD, 2009). 
The political debate initially focused on the entrance of foreigners, on their potential 
competitive role on the labour market,
2 and on the most suitable immigration policy 
to adopt.  
This study aims at gaining better understanding of the assimilation pattern of 
foreign migrants in Italy by comparing foreign migrants with native workers, both 
native migrants and native locals (who work in the same area of birth). The 
comparison, which has never before been conducted in Italy or other countries, is 
very interesting because, unlike foreign migrants, native immigrants are supposed to 
know the language of the destination country, a feature which the empirical literature 
has shown to be very important for the assimilation profile. Moreover, native 
immigrants should also share some of the social rules that apply in the destination 
countries, so that they should not be disadvantaged relative to national local workers, 
or they should at least be less disadvantaged than foreign migrants.  
However, anecdotal evidence on Italian native migrants, reported in novels, films 
and sociological research (for instance Fofi 1975 and Ascolani et al. 1974), presents 
a very different scenario where, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, southern 
native migrants in North Italy had great difficulties in being understood because they 
spoke different local dialects. Moreover, their behavior did not comply with the way 
of life in the industrial cities,
3 so that they were discriminated against in their 
everyday lives, especially when renting accommodation, and perceived as foreigners. 
Employers when hiring do not know the worker’s individual productivity but have 
greater difficulties in evaluating immigrants, both native and foreign, with the 
consequence that native immigrants and foreigners may be more similar in their 
initial wage profiles. 
Our aim is therefore to test whether foreign immigrants (foreigners born abroad and 
working in the region) perform differently from local workers (born and working in 
the same area), immigrant natives (born in an area different from the working one), 




1. Brief historical summary 
 
During the 1980s, as a new country of immigration, Italy was first exposed to 
immigration from neighbouring areas (North Africa) and from Asia (mainly 
Filipinos) and Latin America. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, inflows began from 
the Eastern European countries. Initially, the migrants came from the very close 
Albania, but they later arrived from the more distant Romania and Moldova, 
                                                  
1 For a survey see Del Boca and Venturini 2005. 
2 The available empirical research shows that in general foreigners do not compete with natives in the 
Italian labour market (Gavosto et al. 1999, Venturini and Villosio 2006). 
3 They reputedly grew tomatoes, basil and parsley in their bath tubs.   3
attracted by the similarity of language, but also from as far away as Ukraine (See 
Figure 1).  
In many cases, their entry took place illegally, and their regular position has been the 
result of the many amnesties granted by the Italian government. To become legal, 
migrants should have a regular job offer, and to obtain one, they have usually worked 
illegally for at least a couple of years. The number of regular permits decided by the 
government has always been insufficient to satisfy the supply of immigrants but also 
the national demand for them. Illegal entry was used as a first step in a process of 
legal entrance into the destination country. The repetition of amnesties – a policy 
however shared with the other Southern European countries – has created the 
expectation of further sanatoria and augmented the difficulties in controlling the 
migratory phenomenon (see on this Venturini 2004: ch. 5). The strong reaction of the 
native population against larger legal and official inflows has been accompanied by 
the belief that it is impossible to control the country’s borders. The information set 
out in Fig.1 is derived from residence permits, which only cover legal foreigners. 
Estimates on illegal ones have been proven to fail, but varies from 10 to 40% of the 
legal one (Strozza and Venturini, 2002).    
 
According to the 2001 census and to more recent surveys (2008b, ISTAT) on 
residency permits, 63.6% of foreign residents were located in the North while only 
25% in the Centre and 12% in the South and Islands. In general they had unskilled 
jobs, although in a few cases they had higher educational qualifications. Men usually 
worked in the construction industry, in agriculture and manufacturing, while women 
worked in family services and services in general, while a few also worked in 
industry (2008a, ISTAT). 
 
Foreign migration is a quite recent phenomenon for Italy, although it has a long 
tradition of international emigration: first overseas to the Americas, then mainly to 
the Northern European countries. Italy has also experienced extensive internal 
migration from the less developed areas of the South, but also of the East, to the 
richer areas of the North-West. Emigration from the South to the Northern regions 
once represented 33% of Southern employment. With the Second World War, 
international migration ceased, although it continued in Europe and in Italy, but at a 
lower rate. Migrations between Northern and Southern Italy have declined steadily 
since the 1970s despite the substantial increase in the unemployment differential.  
 
Drawing on social security data, Figure 2 presents the last thirty years of internal 
migration by natives
4: the North-West is by far the main destination area. Emigration 
has taken place mainly from the Southern regions to all possible destinations, but 
most notably to the North-West and Centre. The North East inflows went mainly the 
North West while a negligible amount of people moved from the North-West to the 
South. Finally, inflows from the Centre have been insignificant throughout the 
period. 
After a period of decline, in the second half of the 1990s inflows acquired new 
strength, especially in the North-East. 
 
 
Faini et al. (1997), using a special edition of the quarterly Labour Force Survey, 
show that the fall in mobility levels in Southern Italy may have been driven by a 
combination of demographic factors, high mobility costs, and inefficiencies in the 
                                                  
4 Information on internal migration can also be derived from the ISTAT Local registers which report 
the change of residency. However, these are flows data only.   4
job matching process sufficiently strong to offset the influence of rising 
unemployment differentials. Also Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa (1991) point out the 
role of mismatches in the labour market in explaining the low mobility and the high 
unemployment in the South. More specifically, Cannari et al. (2000) show that the 
North-South housing price differential is a notable factor in explaining the downward 
trend of geographical mobility.  
Since 1995, however, interregional mobility has been increasing. Using information 
on change of residency reported at local registers, Piras (2005) shows that the 
propensity to emigrate increases with the level of education, and that there is 
evidence of a brain drain from the Italian Southern regions.
5 
 
Figure 2 shows on the one hand a general increase of foreign immigration in all the 
destination areas, but on the other, a decline in migration from the South, with the 
exception of the North–East, where, however, the number is exceeded by foreign 




2-Assimilation literature: some recalls. 
 
The economic literature on the assimilation of immigrants starts with the pioneering 
work of Chiswick (1978) and the seminal contributions by Borjas (1985) and La 
Londe and Topel (1992), all of which were based on the USA Census.  
The overassimilation initially found (Chiswick 1978, using a single census) was 
attributed to positive self-selection by migrant workers: that is, they were more 
entrepreneurial, more talented and less risk averse. The under-assimilation of 
immigrants found by Borjas (1985) in the USA was attributed to the lower quality of 
the most recent cohorts.   
The differing quality of cohorts at the time of immigration is due to various factors: 
changes in immigration policy, so that individuals with different characteristics are 
selected; different economic conditions in the destination country which alter the 
nationality mix of immigrants and thus gives rise to changes in their productivity; 
and changes in the composition of the cohorts due to non-casual repatriation.  The 
same result of under-assimilation was reported by La Londe and Topel (1992), but it 
was attributed to the worse economic conditions in the destination country at the time 
of arrival, which offered few career prospects to the migrants.  
This debate is conditioned by the rich set of information available from the USA 
Census, which, however, raises a series of methodological problems more easily 
solved by longitudinal data. The study on true longitudinal data conducted by 
Lubotsky (2007), however, reaches a similar conclusion: immigrant wages increase 
by about 10-15% in the first 20 years in the US but not enough to offset the 35-40% 
immigrant/native wage differential. Assimilation is a function of the immigrants’ 
human capital: while college degree immigrants earn 30% more than the average 
natives, immigrants who arrive with low schooling levels never attain the earnings of 
the average natives (Card 2005).
6 
                                                  
5 This last source reports the number of both workers and family members who change their 
residency, but no labour information. Hence it is not suited for any assimilation study. We overcome 
this problem by using the WHIP – Work Histories Italian Panel – which enables us to discriminate 
among workers on the basis of their place of birth. 
6 David Card (2005) stresses that it is probably more relevant and interesting to understand if the 
second generation of migrant is assimilating, and that it would be a more complete measure of the 
long run parental assimilation process. His results show that if immigrants working in the USA labour 
market earn today less than natives (but not a lot less), and the different education levels explain 10%   5
 
Economic assimilation research in Europe started a little later and has been mainly 
based on national panel data.The core of empirical models has been the immigrant’s 
education before arrival, and after arrival, his/her acquisition of human capital on the 
job before and after immigration, and his/her proficiency in the language of the 
destination country, which also favors the second generation’s integration. Chiswick 
(1991) found that the knowledge of the natives’ language was crucial for assimilation 
into the British labour market, a result confirmed by Shields and Wheastley Price 
(2002), and also by a more recent study by Dustmann and Van Soest (2002) and 
Dustmann and Fabbri (2003).  
In Denmark
7 Neilson et al. (2000) found that a foreigner’s job assimilation increases, 
not with the number of years that s/he has been in the country, but with the number 
of years that s/he has worked in the country. These authors thus emphasize that 
workers increase their human capital only when they are working, not just during 
their presence in the destination country. Kee (1994), in the Dutch case, concludes 
that one of the causes of the lack of assimilation of foreign workers is that only few 
immigrants continue their studies in the receiving country.  Also Grainer and 
Marciano (1975) in the French case and using data from the 1968 census in a 
descriptive way, reach the same conclusions, suggesting that the lower average wage 
for foreigners with a nuclear family is mainly due to less investment in human 
capital, and this varies substantially across ethnic groups. 
 
  
The process of assimilation, however, also depends on the characteristics of 
immigrants who remain in the destination country. As Borjas (1985), Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996) and Dustmann (2003 and 2007) stress in their articles on the return 
decisions of migrants, foreigners who remain may be either the best or the worst of 
the group.
8 The migrant decides to return if the migration project fails or, in the 
opposite case, if the migration project is very successful and allows the migrant to 
return home and start a business there. If those who remain are the best, the empirical 
estimates of assimilation will be biased upwards (over-assimilation), while if those 
who remain are the worst, the estimates will be biased downwards (under-
assimilation); in both cases they are inconsistent. The modeling of the re-migration 
decision - as Dustmann (1996, 2003) terms it - is used as a first step to control for the 
selectivity of the assimilation pattern.  Dustmann (2003), Costance and Massey 
(2003) and Fertig and Schurer (2007) modeled the return decision as a migration 
decision function of the income differential; and Dustmann (2003) developed the role 
played by income in the destination countries, using family ties as instruments. 
Following recent research on return migration and return migration policies; e.g. 
Cassarino (2007) for the Maghreb areas and Mansoor and Quillin (2006) for many 
European and Central Asian countries, Venturini and Villosio (2008) instead focus 
on the role played by economic prospects in the countries of origin in attracting 
migrants back home. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
of the gap, the second generation increases its education level, with a generational transmission of 
education (effect of the education of the father on the education of the son or daughter) equal to the 
one of the other family. 
7 They used administrative data and test a random effect model on foreign wages. 
8 Since his 1985 article Borjas has stressed the selectivity of the migration decision as a function of the 
human capital return of migration. In his 1996 article with Bratsberg he also considers the selectivity 
of the return decision using a cross-sectional approach and always referring to a Roy return of human 
capital model.    6
Other relevant variables are related to the labour market variables which determine 
the worker’s future prospect. Not only is the business cycle upon arrival crucial for 
the immigrant’s assimilation but so too is the sector of employment, which is 
affected in different ways by technological innovation.  Rosholm et al. (2006) found 
that, both in Sweden and Denmark, between 1985 and 1995, job opportunities for 
male immigrants deteriorated. However, by using a panel of administrative data they 
showed that the worsening situation was independent of the different market trends 
in the two countries. It was due instead to structural changes in the markets, where 
the labor demand was for workers with high communication skills, with the 
consequence that immigrants were at a disadvantage. 
 
An additional component of the assimilation pattern is imputed to the migrant 
community (Borjas, 1992, 1995, Cutler and Glaeser, 1997) and has been revised by 
Hatton and Leigh (2007), who abandon the individual analysis of the assimilation 
and shift to analysis of assimilation by the community. The community can exert a 
positive effect by favouring the job search process, but it can also have a negative 
one by reducing the social integration-interaction of immigrants, namely knowledge 
of the host country’s language (see e.g. Chiswich 1991, Dustmann and van Soest 
2002, Shields and Wheatley Price, 2002), and in general of the informal rules on 
living which prevail in the destination countries.  Policies have been adopted to 
discourage the agglomeration of immigrants in particular areas, which has been 
considered a cause of low linguistic proficiency and as reducing the incentive to 
move in search of better job opportunities. In the North-European countries the 
distribution of refugee immigrants around the country seems to be less efficient in 
integrating foreigners than the previous agglomeration (Husted et al. 2001). 
 
3 The assimilation model in the presence of return migration 
 
The assimilation model used here is the traditional human capital model adopted by 
Chiswick, in 1978. We explicitly include measures of human capital acquired on the 
job and out of the job and controls for selection in return migration. 
 
The dependent variable is a measure of the individual wage [yit] which depends on 
individual fixed effects [αi], individual time variant human capital variables [xit], 
worker’s job characteristics [zit] and time invariant individual characteristics [hi]. In 
addition we control for different economic cycle [mrst] which affect both the region 
[r] and the sector [s] where the workers are employed and the size of the migrant’s 
community [c] in the destination area [kcrt] which can favor or reduce the economic 
integration of the migrants.  
 
The process of assimilation, however, also depends on the characteristics of 
immigrants who remain in the destination country. If there is a systematic link 
between the decision to stay and labour market outcomes, a fixed effect estimate 
eliminates the bias. If it is not systematic, even fixed effect estimates give unreliable 
parameter estimates and we need to proceed in two stages. 
 
The true but unobservable utility of leaving the destination country, S
*
it , is: 
 
S*it =  βXit + δRt+υi              (I) 
 
 
   7
 if S*it >0 then the migrant leaves 
if S*it ≤ 0 then the migrant stays 
 
where (Xit) are individual explanatory variables which are common to the 
assimilation equation and the return decision, (Rt) are additional variables which 
affect only the re-migration decision and which serve as identification restrictions; υi 
is an individual error component. 
  
We observe only the leaving of the migrant S=1 or his staying S=0. 
 
Two solutions have been implemented to estimate the probability of leaving the 
destination country: in the first case the probability of leaving the destination country 
(S=1) is modeled within a probit random effect model which controls for the years 
of presence in the destination country; in the second case, a proportional hazard 
function is adopted in modelling the return decision which endogenizes the path 
dependency in the probability of staying. 
 
In the first case assuming that the individual component υi is randomly distributed 
among the individuals with a normal distribution N (0, συ
2), the probability of 
leaving the destination country (S=1) is (II). 
 
Pr(Sit=1) = Φ (β
*Xit + δ












The (Xit) are variables at individual level such as firm size and sector in which the 
worker is employed and the worker’s country of origin; Rt (= Zct+Wit) is composed of 
the macro-economic variables of the countries of origin as attractors of migrants 
back home (Zct): GDP and its growth
9, and the individual variables (Wit), which 
comprise age at entry and years of presence in the destination country and its square, 
and also the share of months spent in irregular employment relative to regular 
employment (see section on results). Our specification aims at capturing the two 
different forces driving movements abroad: one voluntary and the other involuntary. 
Foreign workers, in fact, may be driven by different motivations (dissatisfaction with 
career prospects in the destination country, or lack of opportunities). 
 
In the second case the return decision is modelled with a proportional hazard 
function h(ti) of the probability of leaving the host country at time t conditional on 
surviving to time t-1. The proportional hazard rate model assumes that the covariates 
have a multiplicative effect on the hazard function, given the values of the covariates 
and the respective survival time (t). 
 
                                                  
9 The attempt to introduce also the income dispersion in the origin country to capture the different 
income opportunity has been abandoned by the difficulty of good time series income dispersion. 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ presents a large amount of information on 
income dispersion but their time series dimension is not always reliable, and different values are 
frequently induced by changes in the methodology adopted, not by a real change in the income 
distribution.  The other dataset of Freeman and Osterndoorp  http://www.nber.org/oww/, which has 
recently been used by Belot and Hatton (2008) and Grogger and Hanson (2008) does not use the panel 
structure of the dataset and calculates an average wage premium for each country using all the annual 
information available.   8
) ( ) ( ) ( , 0 R g t h t h it i Χ =                                                                                            (III) 
 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, the hazard for the individual when all 
independent variable values are equal to zero, and g(Xit, R) is a function of the 
covariates.
10 
We include the same covariates as in (II) i.e. individual variables (Xit) that affect both 
the assimilation process and the re-emigration decision (with the exception of year of 
presence) and additional variables R (both macroeconomic variables Zc  and 
individual ones Wi) that affect only the decision to re-emigrate. 
 
The assimilation equation is augmented by a selection term for the return migration: 
 
it s r t t i rst crt i it it i it m k h z x y ε φ ϕ τ ω λ η ξ γ δ β α + + + + + + + + + + =    (IV) 
 
 
Where [λit] is the Inverted Mill Ratio that capture the Heckman error correction when 
the selection model (I) is used; or the log of the hazard rate when the selection model 
(II) is chosen;  [τt ] are time fixed effects, [ϕr] are region fixed effects, [φs]are sector 
fixed effects and [εit] an idiosyncratic error component. 
  
4-Description of the data and the variables used 
 
The only longitudinal dataset which enables distinctions to be made among different 
types of immigrants, foreigners and natives, is the WHIP – Work Histories Italian 
Panel 
11 a database of individual work histories based on Italian social security 
archives (INPS).  
The reference population is made up of all the people – Italian and foreign – who 
have worked in Italy even only for part of their working careers as employees or self-
employed workers or have received income support or pensions from the INPS.  
Open-ended contracts in the public sector and selected professions which have 
autonomous social security funds (i.e. lawyers or notaries) are excluded (about 15% 
of the labour force). This limitation is not particularly important for foreigners, who 
are rarely employed in the public sector, where entrance is made more difficult by 
the presence of national public competitive examinations, while it is more important 
for the analysis of the integration of native immigrants, especially women, who 
frequently participate successfully in national competitive examinations and are 
assigned to jobs in other areas. 
 
Only the WHIP section concerning dependent employment is used in this paper. This 
is a linked employer-employee database that combines individual and job 
characteristics from 1985 to 2003. It is a panel with no attrition because it is 
compulsory for firms to provide information about their workers to INPS. 
We thus restrict our analysis to dependent employment in the private sector. Besides 
public-sector employees and self-employed workers, also workers in the agricultural 
sector (5%) and domestic workers (4.8%) are excluded.  
                                                  
10Generally, g(xj) is assumed to be equal to the relative risk e
xjβ. The model is estimated assuming h0(t) 
to be a Weibull distribution, thus h0(t)=pt
p-1, where p is the shape parameter to be estimated from the 
data. Very similar results are also obtained without imposing h0(t) to be a specific distribution, 
following the Cox partial likelihood estimation. 
11 Developed at the LABORatorio R. Revelli (more information can be found at  
www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip).   9
This last limitation is important for analyses of foreign labour market integration 
because a large share of immigrants work in these two sectors (according to the 
ISTAT Labour Force Survey 2008, agriculture represents 3.9% of foreign 
employment, and domestic workers 18.7%).  In particular, given the female 
monopoly in domestic services and its growing importance, the share of females in 
the number of total residency or work permits is much larger  (about 40-45%) than 
that reported in the WHIP dataset, where male employment dominates (84%). 
However, agriculture and domestic work have very high shares of illegal 
employment, and their exclusion from our analysis increases the homogeneity among 
the sectors. We would also point out that studies on family migration describe female 
migrants as followers in the migratory process and as secondary workers. Hence we 
expect larger differences among the three groups in this case. This feature is not 
limited to foreign immigrants alone; it is also distinctive of the native immigrants 
that were attracted to the North by the booming manufacturing industry, and whose 
families followed later. 
 
For all these reasons we exclude women from the analysis. Moreover, in order to 
avoid measurement errors due to the limited number of observations for foreigners in 
the first years, we restrict our focus to the period 1990-2003, when most of the 
foreign inflows started (see Figure 1) and to (male) workers aged 18-45 in order to 
compare foreigners with the most homogeneous group of Italian workers. 
 
With this dataset we can distinguish among different types of workers: Foreign 
immigrants, Native immigrants and Locals. 
1.  Locals : workers who are mainly employed in the geographical area of birth; 
2.  Native immigrants:  workers who are employed in a geographical area 
different from that of birth; 
3.  Foreign immigrants: Workers born abroad. 
 
To identify native migrants we used four large areas of origin and destination (North-
West, North-East, Centre and South) to avoid as far as possible counting commuting 
workers as native migrants. Commuters are quite numerous, and according to the 
local register they do not change residency. Instead, by choosing changes in large 
areas for the identification of native migrants, we remained in line with the Italian 
perception of native migrants as only long-distance migrants.  
 
Foreign workers were selected by using the place of birth (the dataset did not contain 
information on nationality). Only workers born outside Europe and the main 
industrialised countries were chosen, in order to avoid counting Italians born abroad 
as immigrants. Moreover, also workers born in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela
12 
were excluded, because those are countries of high Italian emigration and with large 
return migration flows from Latin
 America.  
 
The variables in the dataset made it possible to control for the age of the worker, 
gender, type of contract (open-ended, fixed-term, part-time), the skill  level (blue-
collar, white-collar, high skilled white-collar, manager), firm size, sector of 
economic activity, and territorial area. However, the dataset had some important 
limitations. 
 
The main weakness of the dataset was the lack of an education variable. Although 
for native locals and immigrants we could expect that age and skill level would 
                                                  
12 Procedure adopted for the first time in Gavosto et al. 1999 and also by Natale et al. (1999).   10
proxy the education level, for foreigners these two variables were unfortunately not 
enough. We had to bear in mind, however, that the number of years spent at school 
would not be a good proxy for the educational level and productivity of a foreign 
worker because the quality of the education is very different to compare, and in 
addition the education usable depends upon ability in the language used in the host 
country
13 (for instance, Dustmann and Van Soest, 2002). This also explains why 
years of education in the destination country performs much better in explaining the 
foreign wage upgrading. 
 
In addition we had no information about the time of arrival of foreign immigrants. 
However, this problem could be overcome because foreigners did not enter Italy 
before 1985 (when our dataset started). In addition, they entered formal and legal 
employment by means of repeated amnesties and were thus likely to have done so on 
average two years before the first legal enrolment in the WHIP dataset.  
 
Focusing on prime age males, which is the group on which the assimilation analysis 
was performed, we find that on average the wage of native immigrants is 6-10% 
higher that the wage of local natives in all periods, but this difference is never 
statistically significant (see Figure 3). The wage differential between foreigners and 
either local or native immigrants is more irregular: it was quite stable during the 
1990s but has increased since 2000. In 2003 foreign wages were on average about 
75% of those of locals and about 70% of those of native immigrants; and on average 
throughout the 1990-2003 period, foreign workers earned 21% less than natives and 
worked 20% less than natives (Venturini and Villosio, 2008).   
 
 
The differences between foreigners and natives, either locals or immigrants, are in 
large part due to the different characteristics of the two groups and the strong inflows 
of foreign migrants that Italy has experienced in the last years (Table 1). 
        Foreign migrants are younger than local workers, who are also younger than 
native immigrants. In fact migration from the South to the North took place mainly 
after the Second World War and continued at a slower pace, while foreign migration 
is much more recent. Thus foreign workers make up the youngest group.  
Native immigrants are relatively more present in the large and very large firms which 
dominated Italian development during the 1960s, while foreign migrants are 
concentrated in small firms, which instead dominated economic development during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, 25% of foreign migrants are concentrated in very 
small firms (1-20 employees) against 7% and 11% for native immigrants and for 
locals.  
While native locals are employed throughout the country, native immigrants are 
mainly employed in the North-West. During the 1960s, this area was the booming 
Fordist industrial area which attracted labour from all over the country. Foreigners 
instead are mainly located not only in the North-West but also in the North-East; the 
area which on the contrary boomed during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Blue-collar employment dominates in all the groups, but for foreigners blue-collar 
work represents 93% of total employment. Blue-collar employment is also important 
among native immigrants because they moved to the North when labour demand was 
concentrated in large manufacturing companies. Finally, foreign immigrants are 
highly concentrated in the construction sector. 
                                                  
13 For instance, many Filipino maids cannot use their English language skills because nobody speaks 
English in the household where they work.   11
Foreigners from Africa dominate the other ethnic groups, followed by workers from 
Eastern European countries, who form the group that has grown most rapidly in 
recent years. 
 
To capture the effect of human and social capital on the wage assimilation two 
variables were constructed [xit].  
The first referred to human capital accumulated on the job – experience in the current 
and previous jobs – and it was measured by the number of months in regular 
employment.  
The second variable measured the months spent out of the “job” which might 
represents periods devoted to education, employment in sectors not covered by the 
dataset, unemployment, irregular employment and, for foreigners, also return back 
home for a while.  
This second variable could thus play either a positive role in the labour market, by 
capturing the acquisition of human capital in the underground economy or the 
acquisition of more general social capital out of the labour market, or a negative role 
by reducing human capital accumulation. And the role could differ according to the 
group of reference. For locals, the periods of non-employment were expected to 
affect wages negatively, while for native immigrants both options were possible: 
they could acquire human capital working illegally or in another sector or they could 
be unemployed and thus have a negative impact on wage. In the case of foreign 
immigrants the negative impact should be lower because a longer presence in the 
host country, even if not in employment, could positively affect at least the migrant’s 
social capital which has a positive return in the labour market.
14  
Given the recent inflows of foreigners, these have a lower presence than natives in 
the Italian labour market both in employment and not in employment, while native 
migrants seem to be less stable in employment than locals (less in employment and 
more in non-employment). 
 
To control for the demand side and in particular the different trends in the sectors of 
economic activity, we included in our specification also two macroeconomic 
variables: the change in the value added by sector and region and the unemployment 
rate by region. This was done because we wanted to control for the different trends 
of the sectors where workers were employed and which affected their wages. 
 
Finally, the role of the community of the migrant in the destination area [kcrt] was 
captured by the share of the migrant worker community (nationality for foreigners 
and region of birth for native migrants) in regional total employment. Anderson et al. 
(2009) show that the quantity and quality of the enclaves matter in the foreigners 
wage upgrade. Hatton and Leigh (2007) stress the long-term effect of the community 
variable, and even use 10-year lags. Unfortunately, the migration phenomenon in 
Italy is quite recent, and we had too few observations to use long lags such the one 




              
                                                  
14 The sum of the two variables is the best proxy available for the presence of foreign migrants in the 
country.  




5.1 Return migration   
 
According to our model (IV), the first step in the empirical analysis was estimation 
for foreigners of the probability of leaving; modelled both with a probit model (eq. 
II) and with a hazard function (eq. III).  
 
The issue of return migration has received increasing attention in the literature, and 
in order to draw conclusions on the performance of immigrants in the labour market 
it is important to know whether there is selection in migration returning flows.  
Contrary to others, the WHIP dataset unfortunately does not provide information on 
exactly where workers go when they leave legal employment.
15 When they leave the 
dataset, they may move to long-term unemployment, to the underground economy, to 
sectors not covered by the dataset (public sector or self employment), or to other 
countries.  
The selection process is more likely for foreigners than for natives: the hazard ratio 
of exiting definitively for foreigners is 0.5 higher than the hazard of locals and native 
immigrants, even when individual, job and career characteristics are controlled for.
16  
Although we do not exactly know the destination of the selection process, it is likely 
that the majority of foreigners have moved abroad. The literature shows that 
temporary migrations are frequent, and often the rule rather than the exception (see 
Dustmann 1996, and Venturini 2007 for an overview). Even if in the short run they 
may transit into unemployment or irregular jobs, if they are unable to find a legal job 
again, in the medium run they will leave the country.  
 
Whatever the reason, the stronger effect of selection among foreigners than among 
natives points up the need to control for selection bias in the wage equation. The 
empirical results will show whether and how migrants are self-selected, i.e. if they 
are the best or the worst in terms of unobservable skills and abilities. 
This problem did not arise for native migrants, who were no different from locals in 
the probability of leaving the dataset, and who, given the dataset available, were 
followed in their movements across the country. 
In order to capture all possible destinations (movements abroad, entry into long-term 
unemployment or irregular employment), variables for the country of origin as well 
as variables related to the job and career characteristics were included in the 
specification of equations II and III (see section 3).  
 
The results from model II (see Table 2) show a strong negative duration dependence 
(the probability of leaving increases the longer the migrant is in the country) and 
demonstrate that the choice of a hazard model for the selection equation is 
particularly appropriate. 
The hazard model was estimated by assuming h0(t) to be a Weibull distribution thus 
h0(t)=pt
p-1. The value of the shape parameter [p] estimated from the data was 1.85, 
                                                  
15 The most recent research that highlights the importance of return migration (Dustmann 2003, Fertig 
and Shurer 2007, Costant and Massey 2003) uses the GSOEP, which reports among the reasons for 
non-response the category “moved abroad”, and uses this information to identify a return migration.  
16 Results from a duration model on the probability of leaving the WHIP dataset, estimated on the 
three groups of workers pooled (foreigners, native immigrants and locals). Covariates were: age, 
wage, occupation, tenure, firm size, sector, year of entry and dummies for foreigners and native 
immigrants.  The full set of results is available from the authors upon request. 
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meaning that the hazard of failure increases with time at a decreasing rate 
(0.5<1/p<1). This result confirms the negative duration dependence, and therefore 
the temporary character of the migration project. 
 
The other results shown by both models (Table 2) are that the economic growth of 
the origin country attracts emigrants back; and that the younger the age at which the 
migrant enters employment, the more likely it becomes that he will remain. The last 
variable included in this specification (Share of irregular employment) was a proxy 
for the difficulty of the worker in holding a stable job. It was computed as the 
number of months spent out of employment (before leaving for good) and the 
number of months in employment. The results show that the less formal the job, i.e. 
the more the migrant is working in the informal economy or is unemployed, the less 




5.2 Assimilation results 
 
The second step in the analysis was estimation of the assimilation equation 
augmented, for foreigners, by the selection term for return migration. 
The equation was estimated by an OLS fixed effects estimate
17  to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity among individuals (results reported in Table 3). 
 
As expected no striking differences were found among the three groups of workers. 
The Italian labour market is, in fact, quite closely regulated and collective 
agreements cover both unionised and non-unionised workers. However, since the 
1993 Income Policy Agreement, wage variability has increased because firms are 
allowed to adjust their wage structure according to their economic performance and 
to local labour market conditions (Devincenti et al. 2008).  
               
Starting from the selectivity control, the Inverse Mills Ratio coefficient (significant 
at 10% level) as well as the log hazard rate
18 (significant at 1% level) indicate a 
positive correlation between the error terms in the return decision and the wage 
function. Thus, the higher the expected weekly wage, the higher is the probability of 
leaving. The unobservables that positively influence the wage of migrants negatively 
influence their decision to stay. Other things being equal, foreign workers who earn 
more are more likely to leave their present employment, while the less remunerated 
are less likely to abandon the present job. This results thus shows that the main factor 
driving permanent movements out of employment is the lack of opportunities, and 
that their most likely destination is a foreign country (if the best leave they are 
unlikely to be unemployed or in an irregular job), and also it limits the weaknesses of 
our data explained in section 5.1. 
Similar selection is not unusual: it was found by Constant and Massey (2003) in their 
analysis of guest-workers in Germany in 1984; it was found also in some cohorts of 
Fertig and Shurer’s (2007) analysis of the assimilation of migrants who arrived in 
Germany between 1969 and 1973, and among Finnish return migrants from Sweden 
(Rooth and Saarela 2007). 
 
                                                  
17 Note that, given our sample selection as explained in section 1 and the type of estimation described 
in section 2, the time invariant individual characteristics hirs in the equation are eliminated. 
18 Since the average hazard rate is >1 (see table 2) the log hazard rate is on average positive    14
All the human capital variables are significant with the expected sign. The age 
variable is more important for the locals, even if it declines at a higher rate, followed 
by native immigrants and foreigners, while experience on the job is more important 
for native immigrants than for the other two groups of workers and declines at a very 
low rate for the foreign migrants. 
 
Periods spent out of employment have a negative effect on the local workers’ wage 
(as in Edin and Gustavsson 2008), while they are not significant for native 
immigrants and for foreign ones. Immigrants are a more mobile section of the labour 
force, so that foreigners may increase their social capital while they are out of 
employment and thus not decrease in productivity. Nor are native immigrants 
negatively affected by the time off the job. This result highlights, as in the cases 
mentioned before, the importance of experience on the job for the assimilation of 
immigrants, but also the lesser damage caused by time off the job for the immigrants. 
 
The macro variables contribute to explaining the wage dynamics of the three groups 
of workers in different ways. The increase in value added in the sectors and regions 
pushes up the wages of all groups, but foreign migrants are more sensitive to it.  The 
regional unemployment rate matters only for the Italians: it slows down the wage 
growth of native locals or native immigrants. This result is as expected because 
unemployment is mostly made up of native unemployed workers with skills different 
from those of foreign migrants: the inverse relationship between unemployment and 
wages holds only for native workers.  
 
Last, but not least, the community variable is not significant in the case of foreign 
immigrants, while it is significant for native immigrants, and with a negative sign. 
This is not an unusual result: for instance, Hatton and Leigh (2007) found a negative 
sign for the community variable in the UK. If we recall that the variable adopted is 
not a proxy for the size of the immigrants’ community but represents the size of the 
community of workers coming from the same area, the negative sign is less puzzling. 
The results point up a supply effect which reduces the wage growth among native 
immigrants. Probably, the size of the foreign migrant community is too small for it to 
play a similar role. 
 
We now turn to the human capital variable and to the wage assimilation pattern of 
immigrants. Inspection of the accumulated effect of human capital variables (Age 
and Experience) shows that foreign male immigrants never assimilate with native 
immigrants and the locals, because both the coefficients on age and experience are 
smaller than the respective ones. However, periods spent out of employment have a 
negative effect on wage profiles only for locals, while they do not affect the 
immigrants’ human capital. 
 
Figure 4 shows graphically the accumulated effect of human capital variables on 
wages for the three groups of workers. The profiles of locals and native immigrants 
are not statistically different from each another, while they are statistically different 
from that of foreigners.  A test for common coefficient restrictions was run on a 
pooled regression of (a) native immigrants and locals, (b) foreigners and locals. The 
null hypothesis that all the coefficients for native immigrants and foreigners are zero 
was respectively accepted for native immigrants [F(1,356376) = 0.58, Prob > F = 
0.4481] and rejected for foreigners [F(1,323473) = 6.00,  Prob > F = 0.0143]. 
 
   15
 
Workers from the different groups start their career at the same wage level. However, 
as experience increases, the profiles of foreigners and natives start to diverge, 
showing a wage gap of about 10% after 5 years of experience in the labour market 
and more than 15% after 10 years of experience. 
However, the graph does not include the effect of periods spent out of employment, 
which have a negative effect on natives’ wages and do not penalize foreigners’ ones. 
To our knowledge, our approach is the first that addresses the assimilation of native 
immigrants and, although this result has been discussed in the sociological literature, 
it has not been verified with a large dataset. 
 
The increasing difference between the locals’ and foreigners’ wage profiles supports 
the interpretation of the under-assimilation of foreigners, who do not close the wage 
distance with native immigrants, even if they are likely to improve their language 
skills and increase their social capital in the destination area. Language and social 
capital, however, matter a great deal because the native immigrant’s wage profile is 
close to that of the locals. 
 
 
5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
In order to control for heterogeneity among foreign workers better, we now focus on 
the assimilation pattern of different national groups. The dataset did not allow 
analysis by single nationalities: many groups are too small, and the analysis by main 
immigration areas performed in Venturini and Villosio (2008) is not very convincing 
because it mixes too many different ethnic groups. We thus selected the main 
nationalities – Moroccan, Senegalese, and Albanian – and investigated their 
assimilation patterns. 
We also controlled for the impact of the economic cycle: we selected the native and 
foreign workers entering the labour market in the same years, 1991 and 1992, and 
followed their assimilation patterns. 
Finally, the last insight into the assimilation pattern concerns income distribution: we 
divided the above group of workers (those entering in employment in the years 1991 
and 1992) between those receiving a wage above the median on entry and those 
below the median. 
 
5.3.1 Assimilation of different ethnic groups  
 
The three foreign groups, Senegalese, Moroccan and Albanian, which are the largest 
foreign groups in Italy, differ in terms of time of arrival in Italy, sector specialization 
and level of education
19 (see Table 4). Hence different assimilation patterns were 
expected. 
 
The results show that the share of blue-collar workers is lower among Albanians than 
among Moroccans and Senegalese. Albanians also account for the lowest share of 
workers in the north-eastern part of Italy and for the highest share in very small 
firms. Moroccans have the lowest wages, while the Senegalese the highest. However, 
the high Senegalese wages are due to a composition effect: they are older and have 
more experience in the Italian labour market on average than the other two groups. In 
fact, the table also highlights the difference in the timings of entrance into the Italian 
                                                  
19 According to ISTAT Labour Force Survey, in 2006 the share of people from Senegal with primary 
education or less was 88%, compared to 80% of Moroccans and 68% of Albanians.    16
labour market. The Albanian workers are the most recent incomers. This difference 
among ethnic inflows is reflected in the differences in average age and total job 
experience.  
The three groups also have different sector specializations: mainly manufacturing for 
Senegalese workers, construction for Albanians.   
 
Interesting differences emerge in the assimilation patterns. The age variable, which 
probably captures education, is more important for Moroccans but lower than that for 
natives, while experience is particularly rewarding for Moroccans, even higher than 
for natives, and for Albanians. The selectivity coefficient is significant for all the 
groups, but it is higher for Moroccans, who thus suffer more from limited wage 
opportunities in the Italian labour market
20.  
 
The experience-wage profiles show that workers from Albania are very similar to 
natives at entrance in the labour market, but their career measured in terms of wage, 
proceeds at a lower pace than that of locals. If this pattern is confirmed also in the 
future (recall that this group of immigrants has only recently entered Italy) after 10 
years of labour market experience the differential between the two groups will reach 
10%. Although Albanian workers are the immigrants with the highest level of 
education, they are hired for unskilled positions, in which they seem to be stuck. 
The situation is worst for workers from Senegal, who have a differential of 30% at 
entrance that reaches 50% after 10 years. Moroccans are in between, with an initial 
differential from locals of 18% that becomes 23% after 10 years. This result shows 
that, even if Senegalese workers have higher wages on average, when workers and 
career characteristics are controlled for, they tend to be the most penalized by the 




5.3.2 Entrants in employment in 1991 and 1992, all. 
 
Some of the results presented in the previous section may have been affected by the 
different economic cycles prevailing at the time of entrance into employment and 
which conditioned the future wage path and the future wage assimilation process. 
This is a usual problem in empirical analyses of migration, but it becomes even more 
important in the case at hand because while native locals enter the labour market 
throughout the period, foreigners arrived in the late 1980s while a large share of 
native immigrants did so in the 1970s. Of course, age and experience capture the 
human capital embodied by the worker and the macro variables capture different 
regional and sector economic cycles, but in order to control more carefully for the 
differences in the assimilation pattern among the three groups, we selected a 
subsample comprising only workers that entered the labour market in the same 
period. We thus performed the estimates only with workers who had entered the 
labour market in the same two years: 1991 and 1992. 
In this case we expected both native immigrants and locals to have the same wage 
pattern because they entered the labour market in a period when differences, also 
from a cultural point of view, among workers from different regions were less 
marked.  
                                                  
20 In all the three groups the average hazard rate estimated was >1   17
 
 
Table 6 sets out the results. The age variable has a higher impact on wages for locals 
and the experience variable for native immigrants. Hence foreign immigrants never 
catch up. The macro variables exert the effect already found in the general analysis: 
the value added is positive for all groups, and unemployment is effective only for 
locals. The community variable is not significant in either case. 
If we compare the results on assimilation in the subsample of the entrants in 1991-92 
with the overall sample results, we find a similar non-assimilating profile between 
foreigners and natives, and an identical profile between native immigrants and locals. 
However, differently from the general results, a wage differential between foreigners 
and natives emerges also at entrance: it is 6% at entrance, rises to 14% after five 
years of experience, and reaches 18% after 10 years of experience, as Figure 6 
shows.  
These results again point up the differences in the returns on wage by group of 
origin. In fact, this group of workers is mainly composed of African workers (1 out 
of 4 is from Senegal), who formed the first wave of immigrants, and who have the 
lowest wage profiles (see previous section). 
 
5.3.2  Blue collars by wage distribution 
 
The foregoing analyses indicate the existence of an ethnic differential. In this section 
we go into deeper detail by splitting the blue-collar workers who entered in 1991 and 
1992 into two groups: those who have a wage level above the median at entrance and 
those below, for both locals and foreigners.
21 The idea is to control for the skill level 
of workers. Since almost all foreign workers are manual workers we restrict the 
analysis to blue collars and we compare the performance of the very low skilled with 
those with some degree of specialization and who thus entered the labour market 
with an higher wage level.  
The age variable is more important for workers below the median, both natives and 
foreigners, while experience plays a more important role in the group entering above 
the median wage level. Having controlled better for the skill level, the selection 
coefficients are no longer significant. 
 
What emerges is a very high and increasing gap in the lowest part of the distribution 
between native and foreigners (27% at entrance, 36% after 10 years). In the higher 
part the differential is null at entrance, but increases with experience in the labour 
market and reaches 13% after 10 years. Moreover the gap within the group of natives 
between those below and those above the median remains almost constant in the 
period, while for foreigners the high differential at entrance (43% between the 
foreigners with the entrance wage above the median and those below it) is decreasing 
(it reduces to 35% after 10 years) because the group above the median slowly loses 
position, ending after 10 years at a level below that of the low-skilled manual native 
workers. Thus, among foreign migrants, even those that seem the best lose position 
against natives and increase their differential. This result strengthens our conclusion 
concerning the probability of return being higher among the best workers.  
                                                  
21 In this analysis we do not consider the native immigrants who behave like the locals   18
 
 
6.  Concluding comments 
 
The analysis in this paper has focused on the wage assimilation of male immigrants 
in the Italian labour market. Italy has a quite recent history of foreign immigration 
but a longer history of internal migration from the Southern regions to the North.  
The aim of the paper has been to understand the pattern of assimilation of foreign 
migrants with respect to native immigrants, i.e. internal migrants, and local natives. 
This is a unique opportunity, like an experiment, where we have compared locals and 
native immigrants proficient in the language of the destination country but 
nevertheless immigrants. 
Both groups of migrants have been compared with native locals, who represented the 
linguistic benchmark and the social capital of reference.  
For this purpose, we used the administrative dataset on dependent employment, 
WHIP, which enabled us to distinguish among foreigner workers, locals, and native 
immigrants; a comparison not previously made. Moreover, by using this dataset we 
were able to build variables intended to capture human capital in the job and out of 
the job. A fixed effect model of weekly wage of males aged 18-45, which controlled 
for unobserved heterogeneity and selection in return migration, was tested. In 
particular, two different methods to estimate return migration were implemented. 
 
The estimates showed the presence of selection in the return decision; those better 
able to earn higher wages are more likely to leave. 
Foreign workers have an entrance wage similar to those of natives, but the 
accumulation of experience increases the wage gap with natives. Time out of 
employment does not negatively affect foreign wages, showing a possible general 
non-negative effect of the months spent out of the job, which instead prevails in the 
case of native locals in our sample and in other empirical studies. 
Comparison between internal native immigrants and locals has shown that native 
immigrants are similar to locals. While only the effect of the time spent out of the job 
is similar for both migrant groups. 
The control for the sector and regional change in value added is similar for all the 
groups, while only locals are sensitive to regional unemployment rate. This last result 
is not surprising because the regional unemployment rate is made up of local 
workers, while native and foreign immigrants are in more mobile segments of the 
labour force and are less present among the unemployed in the destination region. 
In order to check the differences across different groups in terms of entrance period 
and origin, we analysed specific origin groups (workers from Morocco, Senegal and 
Albania) in a sub-sample made up of the entrants in the labour market in the same 
years, 1991 and 1992, and by wage level at entrance. The results show that there are 
differences across origin group, in that workers from Senegal are the least 
assimilated. The gap with natives is especially wide in the lower tail of the wage 
distribution.  
 
Last but not least, the importance of the community effect is limited. It plays a 
negative role for native immigrants, indicating competition within the group in the 
labour market. Among foreigners, it is instead positive for the Moroccan group, 
where a supportive role is detected, while it is insignificant for the other 
communities, probably because they are still too small. 
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The main conclusion is that comparison among the assimilation patterns of foreign 
and national migrants confirms that language and social capital matter for 
assimilation. In fact, native migrants assimilate, while foreign immigrants never 
close the gap with natives. If foreign migration becomes a permanent phenomenon, 
Italy should invest in integration policies designed to prevent the formation of a 
separate group of foreign workers which might provoke suspicions of discrimination 
against immigrants.   20
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Description Source  Level  of 
aggregation 
      
Months  of  employment    Sum of months spent in regular 
employment up to year t since 1985 for 
natives and since entrance in the Italian 
labour market for foreigners 
WHIP Individual 
Months out of employment  Sum  of months spent out of regular 
employment up to year t since first 
employment spell observed 
WHIP Individual 





Reg. unemployment rate  Regional unemployment rate in t  ISTAT Labour 
force survey 
Region 
Share  of  reg.  foreign  employment  Share of foreign employment of the 
individual’s same country of origin on 
total regional employment in year t 
WHIP Country  of 
origin and 
Region 
Real GDP   Real Gross Domestic Product per capita  Penn  Word 
Tables 
Country 
Growth rate of real GDP  growth r a t e  o f  R e a l  GDP per capita 




Years of stay  Number of years of presence in Italy since 
entrance 
WHIP Individual 
Age  at  entry    Age of foreigner when entering legal 
employment  
WHIP Individual 
Note. Countries included: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Cote d`Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Lebanon, 
Libya, Macedonia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay 
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Figure 2. Share of native immigrants and foreigners in total area employment by origin 
areas. 
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Source: WHIP and INPS data, own calculations   25
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Figure 5.  Experience- log wage profiles for foreigners by main national groups and 
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Figure 6. Experience- log wage profiles for foreigners, native immigrants and locals, 
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Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Figure 7. Experience- log wage profiles for foreigners, native immigrants and locals, 
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Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics in 1990-2003 for foreign immigrants, native immigrants and 
locals. 
 
  Foreign immigrants  Native immigrants  Locals 
Variable Mean  (Std. Err.)  Mean  (Std. Err.)  Mean  (Std. Err.) 
Weekly wage  291.8  (97.2)  336.97  (0.67)  317.35  (0.67) 
Age  31.79  (6.1)  31.79  (6.0)  30.85  (6.1) 
Age at entrance  27.93  (5.5)  23.75  (4.4)  22.79  (4.1) 
Months of employment  42.88  (38.4)  85.14  (57.4)  90.01  (58.4) 
Months out of employment  10.27  (19.2)  19.65  (31.6)  15.13  (26.9) 
Blue collar  0.93  (0.3)  0.68  (0.5)  0.64  (0.5) 
White collar  0.03  (0.2)  0.30  (0.5)  0.32  (0.5) 
Apprentices  0.03  (0.2)  0.02  (0.1)  0.04  (0.2) 
Atypical  0.14  (0.3)  0.11  (0.3)  0.11  (0.3) 
Firm size 0_20  0.58  (0.5)  0.40  (0.5)  0.45  (0.5) 
Firm size 20_200  0.30  (0.5)  0.29  (0.5)  0.28  (0.4) 
Firm size 200_1000  0.08  (0.3)  0.15  (0.4)  0.12  (0.3) 
Firm size _over1000  0.05  (0.2)  0.17  (0.4)  0.14  (0.3) 
North West  0.39  (0.5)  0.48  (0.5)  0.31  (0.5) 
North East  0.37  (0.5)  0.25  (0.4)  0.23  (0.4) 
Centre  0.18  (0.4)  0.21  (0.4)  0.19  (0.4) 
South  0.05  (0.2)  0.06  (0.2)  0.28  (0.4) 
Manufacturing  0.52  (0.5)  0.47  (0.5)  0.50  (0.5) 
Construction  0.21  (0.4)  0.16  (0.4)  0.13  (0.3) 
Services  0.27  (0.4)  0.38  (0.5)  0.38  (0.5) 
Mediterranean Africa 




        
Africa other 




        
Latin America  0.03  (0.2)        
Asia  0.17  (0.4)        
East Europe 




        
Avg. community size by region   0.63%  (0.6%)  2.4%  (1.6%)    
N. observations  33622    62484   371481  
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 2. Results of the selection equation. 
 
  Probit Random Effect  Weibull model 
  Model (II)  Model (III) 
        
Years of stay in Italy  0.797 ***     
 (0.021)      
Years of stay squared  -0.03 ***     
 (0.001)      
Real GDP per capita in origin country  0.0001 ***  1.000  *** 
 (0.00002)   (0.00001)   
Growth rate of Real GDP p.c. in orig. country  0.006 *  1.081  *** 
 (0.003)   (0.010)   
Age at entry  0.044 ***  1.035  *** 
 (0.005)   (0.004)   
Share of irregular employment  0.017 ***  1.008  * 
 (0.005)   (0.005)   
p (shape parameter)      1.846    
     (0.026)   
1/p     0.542     
     (0.008)   
Predicted hazard rate (std. dev.)      5.15    
     (10.1)   
N. obs  36663   8439   
Log likelihood  -9446.37   -4145.06   
Chi2 6223.71   2495   
Prob>chi2 0.000   0.000   
Dependent variable: probability of leaving.  
Further controls: firm size, sector and year of entry. Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically 
significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 3. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms, males aged 18-45. 
 
  Foreign immigrants Foreign immigrants  Native immigrants  Locals 
 (Correction=  (Correction=         
  Inv. Mills Ratio)  Hazard .Rate)         
                
Intercept 4.425 *** 4.482 *** 4.498  ***  4.454 ***
 (0.253)   (0.237)   (0.132)    (0.039)  
Age 0.032 *** 0.031 *** 0.046  ***  0.056 ***
 (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.008)    (0.003)  
Age ^2  -0.00019 *** -0.00013 *  -0.00022  ***  -0.00026 ***
 (0.0001)   (0.0001)   (0.00004)    (0.00002)  
Months of employment  0.0023 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0031  ***  0.002 ***
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)    (0.0002)  
Months of employment ^2  -0.000003 *** -0.000002 *** -0.00001  ***  -0.00001 ***
 (0.000001)   (0.000001)   (0.0000005)    (0.0000002)  
Months out of employm.  0.0009    0.001    -0.0004     -0.001 ***
 (0.0007)   (0.0007)   (0.0006)    (0.0004)  
Log Value Added  0.070 *** 0.073 *** 0.055  ***  0.061 ***
 (0.022)   (0.021)   (0.011)    (0.004)  
Reg. unemployment rate  0.002    0.002    -0.003  ***  -0.006 ***
 (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.001)    (0.0003)  
Share of reg. for. employm.  0.256    0.043    -1.668  ***     
 (1.280)   (4.300)   (0.575)       
Share of reg. for. empl. ^2  0.016    -0.032    0.103  *     
 (1.600)   (0.320)   (0.061)       
Correction for return migration  0.005 *  0.032 ***        
 (0.003)   (0.007)          
N obs  27,933   27,933   60,678    359,527  
F 119.00   119.88   591.88    6031.63  
corr(u_i, Xb)  =  -0.533   -0.5348   -0.3118    -0.4073  
Prob > F           =  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000    0.0000  
R-sq:  within  =  0.3673   0.3680   0.5296    0.6079  
between =  0.0587   0.0584   0.1855    0.2370  
overall =  0.1281   0.1273   0.2599    0.3341  
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector, region and year dummies. Robust Standard errors 
in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 4. Characteristics of foreign workers by origin. Average 1990-2003 
 
 Senegal  Morocco  Albania 
     
Weekly Wage (€)  278.7  267.7  273.1 
Average months of employment  52.97  44.81  34.29 
Average  age  33.50 31.03 30.59 
Blue collar (%)  0.99  0.93  0.92 
Firm size 0_20 (%)  0.51  0.56  0.68 
North East (%)  0.32  0.42  0.29 
Construction  (%)  0.07 0.19 0.43 
Manufacturing  (%)  0.73 0.55 0.37 
Share in 1990 (%)  0.169  0.081  0.000 
Share in 2003 (%)  0.131  0.136  0.142 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 
Table 5. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms for males aged 18-45, 
main national groups. 
 
 Moroccans  Senegalese  Albaniens  Locals 
             
Intercept 4.273 *** 4.081 *** 4.496  ***  4.454  ***
  (0.407)  (0.523)  (0.633)   (0.039)   
Age 0.049 *** 0.035 *** 0.033  *  0.056  ***
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.019)   (0.003)   
Age ^2  -0.00032 *** -0.00003    -0.00006     -0.00026  ***
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)   (0.0000)   
Months of employment  0.0014 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0027  ***  0.002  ***
 (0.001)   (0.0003)   (0.001)    (0.0002)   
Months of employment ^2  -0.00001 **  -0.000004 *** -0.00001  ***  -0.00001  ***
  (0.000005)  (0.000001)  (0.000003)   (0.000000)   
Months  out  of  employm.           -0.001  ***
           (0.0004)   
Log Value Added  0.106 *** 0.098 **  0.059     0.061  ***
  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.049)   (0.004)   
Reg. unemployment rate  0.010    0.005    0.005     -0.006  ***
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006)    (0.0003)   
Share of reg. for. employm.  3.942 *  -4.115    1.742        
  (2.319)  (5.144)  (3.484)       
Corr. for return migration (Hazard  rate)  0.074 *** 0.025 **  0.049 ***    
  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.016)       
N  obs  4386  5997  3904    359527   
F 3.31E+10   2625.88   21.46    6031.63   
corr(u_i, Xb)  =  -0.7712   -0.5687   -0.7416    -0.4073   
Prob > F           =  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000    0.0000   
R-sq:  within  =  0.4507   0.4691   0.3279    0.6079   
between  =  0.0535  0.0438  0.0757    0.237   
overall  =  0.1104  0.1489  0.0995   0.3341   
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector, region and year dummies. Robust Standard errors 
in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 6. Log wage profiles with increasing experience in the labour market.  
Entrants in 1991 and 1992 
 Foreigners  Native  immigrants  Locals 
  MEAN (Std. err.) MEAN (Std. err.)  MEAN  (Std. err.)
Average N obs   3554   4878   27083   
Weekly wage in euros at entrance  213.5 (68.5) 253.4 (121.2)  226.9  (100.2)
Average weekly wage in euros in the 1991-
2003 period  276.2 (102.6) 351.4 (185.2)  322.0  (154.3)
Age at entrance  28.8 (5.8) 27.6 (7.1) 25.4  (6.6)
Average number of months of employment 
in the 1991-2003 period  54.0 (42.4) 56.5 (43.0)  61.0  (46.2)
Average number of months out of 
employment in the 1991-2003 period  14.0 (21.2) 21.1 (28.3)  16.0  (24.7)
    
% Morocco  17.3    
% Senegal  25.9    
% Albania  3.8    
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 
Table 7. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms for males aged 18-45, 
entrants in 1991 and 1992. 
 
 Foreigners  Native  immigrants  Locals 
            
Intercept 4.843 ***  4.772 ***  4.731  *** 
 (0.177)   (0.341)   (0.126)   
Age 0.046 ***  0.045 ***  0.067  *** 
 (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.002)   
Age ^2  -0.0005 ***  -0.00031 **  -0.00019  *** 
 (0.0001)   (0.0002)   (0.0001)   
Months of employment  0.0008 *  0.0018 ***  0.0008  *** 
 (0.0005)   (0.0005)   (0.0002)   
Months of employment ^2  0.000003    0.00001    -0.00001  *** 
 (0.000003)   (0.000008)   (0.000001)   
Months out of employm.          -0.00135  *** 
         (0.0002)   
Log VA  0.057 ***  0.12 ***  0.035  *** 
 (0.018)   (0.036)   (0.014)   
Reg. unemployment rate  0.002    0.007    -0.013  *** 
 (0.003)   (0.005)   (0.001)   
Share of reg. for. employm.  -1.387    0.537       
 (1.387)   (1.074)      
Corr. for return migr. (Hazard Rate)  0.012 *         
 (0.007)          
N obs  3554   4878   27083   
F 58.88   29.85   434.10   
corr(u_i, Xb)  =  -0.4074   -0.1836   -0.3654   
Prob > F           =  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
R-sq:  within  =  0.4458   0.5257   0.5933   
between =  0.1222   0.2206   0.2178   
overall =  0.2239   0.3041   0.3371   
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector, region and year dummies. Robust Standard errors 
in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 






Table 8. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms, males aged 18-45, 
blue-collar entrants in 1991 and 1992 by wage level at entrance. 
 
 Foreigners  Natives 
 
wage at entrance
  < median 
wage at entrance
 > median 
wage at entrance 
 < median 
wage at entrance
 > median 
             
Intercept 4.366 ***  4.791 ***  4.637 ***  4.771  *** 
 (0.441)   (0.289)   (0.178)   (0.215)   
Age 0.049 ***  0.037 ***  0.057 ***  0.036  *** 
 (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.005)   (0.006)   
Age ^2  -0.00003    -0.0007 ***  -0.00065 ***  -0.00082  *** 
 (0.0003)   (0.0002)   (0.0001)   (0.0001)   
Months of employment  0.0008 *  0.0017 ***  0.0014 ***  0.0032  *** 
 (0.0005)   (0.0005)   (0.0004)   (0.0004)   
Log VA  0.023    0.039    0.034 *  0.052  *** 
 (0.038)   (0.026)   (0.019)   (0.022)   
Reg. unemployment rate  -0.003    0.013 *  -0.012 ***  -0.007  *** 
 (0.004)   (0.008)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Share of reg. for. employm.  0.0003    3.864           
  (0.030)   (5.520)        
Corr. for return migr. (Hazard Rate)  -0.0046    -0.0005           
  (0.012)   (-0.050)        
N obs  1116   1156   4002   4577   
F 43.99   21.76   211.79   199.35   
Corr(u_i, Xb)  =  -0.617   -0.219   -0.383   -0.092   
Prob > F           =  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
R-sq:  within  =  0.571   0.353   0.604   0.536   
between =  0.125   0.136   0.112   0.313   
overall =  0.192   0.188   0.296   0.401   
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector, region and year dummies. Robust Standard errors 
in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 
 